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Abstract
We analyze the impact of choosing an elite school on high school graduation in
an early tracking system in Flanders (Belgium). Elite schools offer only an academic
track, while most other schools offer multiple tracks. On average, students experience
a 3.3 percentage point increase in the likelihood of obtaining a degree. We find that
the effects are heterogeneous. On average, students who self-select into elite schools
do not experience an effect, while students who do not choose an elite school would
experience positive effects. Our results can be explained by different tracking decisions
in both types of schools.
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1 Introduction
Completing secondary education is important for opportunities in life. Among the group of
25-34-year-olds in OECD countries, the unemployment rate is 14.8% for individuals who did
not complete secondary education, but only 7.8% and 5.8% for individuals who completed
secondary and higher education, respectively. Furthermore, high school dropouts earn only
78% of what workers earn who completed at most secondary education. Despite the impor-
tance of a high school degree for future success on the labor market, 16% of young adults in
OECD countries drop out without obtaining a degree (OECD, 2018).
In this paper we study the causal and heterogeneous impact of choosing an elite school
on completing secondary education. We define an elite school as a school that offers only the
academic track. We use a rich administrative dataset of all entrants in secondary education
in 2003 and 2004 in Flanders, the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium. 8% of the students in
our sample did not graduate from high school, which can have an important impact on their
future labor market opportunities. In Belgium, unemployment among high school dropouts
is particularly high. Among the group of 25-34-year-olds, the unemployment rate for high
school dropouts is 22.7% but only 9.0% and 4.7% for individuals who completed secondary
and higher education, respectively (OECD, 2018).1
In the second part of this paper, we study how the organization of the tracking system
can explain our results. Many countries apply some form of tracking and group students
by their ability and preferences. Countries can be classified according to two different types
of tracking systems. The first type of countries like Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece,
Japan and the Netherlands split students into academic and vocational tracks. The second
type of countries like the US, Canada, UK and New Zealand apply course-by-course tracking
and allow students to choose the level of their courses instead. While tracking into different
programs often happens between schools, course-by-course tracking is applied within schools
(Chmielewski, 2014).
In Flanders, students are tracked into different programs around the age of 13. The
first year of secondary education consists of a comprehensive program and is open to all
students who are qualified to attend secondary education. Students can also follow this
program at the school of their choice as free school choice is legally enforced. In the following
years, students specialize in a certain program, within a track. Programs can be categorized
into four hierarchically ordered tracks. The academic track prepares students for academic
1For Flanders, statistics show that 27.6% of high school dropouts were still unemployed one year after
leaving school in 2017, while this was only 9.3% and 3.5% for students graduating from secondary and higher
education, respectively (VDAB, 2019).
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programs (at least four years) at university.2 Other tracks prepare for professional programs
(three years) in tertiary education or for the labor market. As long as students perform well,
they can choose from among all of the programs. If they fail some courses, they may be
excluded from certain options in the following year. Alternatively, they may be required to
repeat a year of study.
There exist several types of schools in Flanders. While elite schools offer only the aca-
demic track, most non-elite schools offer the academic track in combination with other tracks.
While grouping students of different abilities into the same school is standard in countries
that use course-by-course tracking, it is less often the case in systems that split students early
in academic and vocational tracks.3 The supply of tracks within a specific school can affect
study decisions if students prefer to stay in the same school. If schools offer programs in all
tracks, tracking can occur within the same school. If schools specialize in one track, students
may be less likely to choose the optimal track if it is not offered at this school. If students do
not perform well, they can still switch to a lower track (downgrade) during their secondary
education. Recent evidence shows that misallocated students can avoid the negative effects
of early tracking by switching tracks when they are older (Dustmann et al., 2017). If more
study options are available in the same school, it is possible that misallocated students are
more likely to switch programs. Therefore, offering several tracks within a school can im-
prove study outcomes by reducing switching costs. On the other hand, specialization in one
track can have benefits in attracting a more homogeneous peer group or specialized teachers.
It could also be more efficient if the school infrastructure is highly track-specific.
Enrollment in an elite school is a composite treatment. First, tracking decisions can
be different in elite and non-elite schools due to a different supply of tracks. Second, elite
schools attract students of higher ability and of higher socioeconomic status leading to a
different peer group composition. Finally, there could be differences in grading standards as
schools have some autonomy in deciding about grade progression. Notice that the Flemish
government sets out common learning goals for students to achieve in each track and that
these learning goals do not differ between elite and non-elite schools. This implies that
students in the academic track in elite and non-elite schools follow the same curriculum.
To study the treatment effects of elite schools on high school graduation, we face the fol-
lowing two problems: (1) endogeneity because of non-random self-selection into elite schools
2Although there are almost no admission standards for higher education in Flanders, the tracks students
follow in high school are important predictors of success at these institutions (Declercq and Verboven, 2015).
3Some other countries also have multi-track schools. See for example the “kooperative Gesamtschulen”
in Germany (Mu¨hlenweg and Puhani, 2010), or comprehensive schools in the Netherlands (Oosterbeek et
al., 2020).
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and (2) heterogeneity in the effects. We address the first problem by using distance as an
instrument for school choice. The policy of free school choice and the large availability of dif-
ferent schools within a neighborhood make distance a reasonable instrument for school choice
in Flanders, conditional upon controlling for neighborhood characteristics. If the treatment
effect differs between students because of unobserved characteristics, the conventional two
stage least squares (2SLS) estimator is difficult to interpret, as, in general, it cannot be inter-
preted as an average treatment effect (ATE), average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)
or average treatment effect on the non-treated (ATNT) (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005).
We allow for heterogeneous treatment effects in different ways. First, we follow the
framework of Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and estimate Marginal Treatment Effects (MTEs)
to compute average treatment effects. This requires enough observations in treated and non-
treated states at each value of the unobserved cost of treatment. The richness of our data
allows us to use standard semi-parametric estimation techniques to recover the ATT. We
compare this estimate to an estimate that is derived from a potential outcome model that uses
limiting functional form and distributional assumptions. This also gives us an estimate of
the ATE and ATNT and illustrates how observable background characteristics can explain
differences in treatment effects. Finally, we show how a factor structure, as proposed by
Aakvik et al. (2005), allows us to identify distributional treatment effects: the percentage
of students that would experience a positive or negative treatment effect from elite schools.
We obtain the following main findings. On average, students are more likely to obtain a
high school degree if they start at an elite school. We obtain a significantly positive ATE of
0.033, which implies that choosing an elite school, on average, increases the probability of
graduating from high school by 3.3 percentage points. We also find important heterogeneity
in the treatment effect, reflected in a small and statistically insignificant ATT and a large
ATNT of 5.1 percentage points. We can therefore conclude that the students who do not
choose elite schools would benefit most from treatment.
Next, we find that the average treatment effects still mask a lot of heterogeneity. We
find more positive effects for students who had repeated a grade before starting high school
and students with a low-educated mother. These are characteristics that make students less
likely to choose an elite school. This finding is in line with the above finding, that students
who are expected to gain the most from elite schools are less likely to start at an elite school.
Furthermore, our results indicate that there is heterogeneity within both groups of treated
and non-treated students, with a substantial fraction gaining and suffering from elite schools
in both groups.
Finally, we study how the tracking of students is influenced by the type of school and
whether a different tracking in elite and non-elite schools explains the heterogeneity we
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find. We therefore extend the potential outcomes framework by modeling the track choice
in the second year of high school. This model shows that choosing the academic track
raises the probability of graduating from high school. Moreover, elite schools encourage
students to study the academic track, but primarily for non-treated students. This is because
most treated students would choose an academic track in any school. At the same time,
treated students are very reluctant to leave an elite school and aim for a lower ranked track
when they do not perform well. Consequently, this puts them at a risk of dropping out.
We provide further evidence for this explanation by applying our main model to a new
outcome: downgrading, that is, a switch to a lower track during their studies. We also
find here that elite schools make students less likely to downgrade, especially those with the
highest preferences and the least positive or most negative treatment effects on high school
completion.
Our findings have important implications for policy. Encouraging students to start at
elite schools can raise the overall degree completion in secondary education. However, there
is a lot of heterogeneity in the effect of treatment within both the group of treated and non-
treated students and the reverse selection on gains shows that students are not optimally
choosing their school. An optimal policy would therefore allocate students to the type
of school that benefits them most. Students from disadvantaged backgrounds who have
the ability to pursue an academic track should be encouraged to start at an elite school.
Information provision and more active counseling could help students choosing their school.
Furthermore, it is important to encourage students with a high preference for elite schools
to consider another school when they do not perform well in the academic track (such as
students from a high socioeconomic background).
Our paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, we contribute to the literature
on the effects of elite schools. Similar to our study, Clark and Del Bono (2016), Dustmann
et al. (2017), Guyon et al. (2012) and Oosterbeek et al. (2020) analyze the effects of attend-
ing a school that specializes in academic programs. Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) and
Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2014) also study the effects of elite schools but define these schools
on the basis of the quality of their peers. Nevertheless, also in our context, elite schools
attract a group of students who come from families with a stronger socioeconomic back-
ground and generally perform better in school. In contrast to previous studies, we study the
observed and unobserved heterogeneity in the treatment effect. We characterize the degree
of heterogeneity by comparing the ATT and ATNT, but also the percentage of students
who gain and loose. This shows that averages can mask large differences between students.
Moreover, identification strategies in other papers identify an average treatment effect for
specific groups in the population. Our results show that the large degree of heterogeneity in
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treatment effects makes it difficult to extrapolate these results to the total population.4 We
also show how the supply of tracks in each type of school can explain heterogeneity in the
effect.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the impact of educational tracking. Several
papers have looked at the consequences of tracking students at an early age (Fu and Mehta
(2018), Hanushek and Woessmann (2006), Pekkarinen et al. (2009), Roller and Steinberg
(2020)).5 Other characteristics of tracking systems remain largely unexplored, with the
exception of Cockx et al. (2018), De Groote (2019) and Dustmann et al. (2017) who
investigate the impact of being able to switch tracks at a later age. We contribute to this
literature by comparing the impact of tracking between and within schools.
Finally, we apply advances in the econometric literature on estimating treatment effects
proposed by Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and Aakvik et al. (2005). We are able to identify
semi-parametric MTE estimates to derive the ATT and compare it with the results of a
model that estimates a potential outcomes model with functional form and distributional
assumptions.6 Imposing these assumptions also gives us additional insights in the degree
of heterogeneity of the treatment effect. We extend the potential outcomes model and also
model an intermediate choice, the high school track. Simultaneously modeling both choices
allows us to study how school choice influences track choice and provides insight into the
underlying mechanism that explains the effects of elite school attendance.
The paper is organized as follows. We start by providing an overview of secondary
education in Flanders and introduce our dataset. Next, we discuss the empirical framework in
Section 3 and discuss the validity of our instrument in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the main
results, Section 6 the underlying mechanism and Section 7 concludes. Online Supporting
Information Appendices A-D provide details about the construction of the dataset, sensitivity
analyses, a discussion on the role of control variables and additional tables and figures.
4Oosterbeek et al. (2020) study observed heterogeneity in the treatment effect based on test scores before
the start of high school. Their study considers only students who were qualified to enter the highest track
and decided to apply for an elite school. We look at decisions before tracking occurs and we characterize
both observed and unobserved heterogeneity in the treatment effect.
5See also Cummings (2017) and Duflo et al. (2011) for evidence in developing countries.
6MTEs are usually only identified for a subset of individuals, such that it is not possible to estimate
the ATE, ATT or ATNT nonparametrically. See, for example, Doyle (2007 and 2008) and Galasso and
Schankerman (2015). Other papers rely on parametric assumptions on the shape of the MTE curve or the
underlying behavioral model to improve common support or obtain sufficiently precise estimates (Carneiro
et al. (2011), Carneiro et al. (2016), Cornelissen et al. (2018), Basu et al. (2007), and Nybom (2017)).
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2 Secondary education in Flanders
In this section we discuss the institutional context in Flanders and show some descriptive
statistics about enrollment and study outcomes for students choosing elite and non-elite
schools.
2.1 Institutional overview
Flanders is the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium, located in the North. It consists of approxi-
mately 60% of the population of 11 million inhabitants.7 After finishing primary school, stu-
dents enroll in secondary education, usually at the age of 12. Students can choose between all
schools in Flanders since school choice is not geographically restricted and free school choice
is law-enforced.8 In the first year of secondary education (grade 7), almost all students start
in a comprehensive program. A small proportion starts in a vocational-preparatory program.
As these students often did not successfully complete primary education, we do not consider
this group in our analysis.
After the first year, students can choose between programs in four hierarchically ordered
tracks.9 The academic track is the highest track and prepares students for academic programs
in higher education (mostly four- or five-year programs). The technical track and the artistic
track prepare students for professional programs in higher education (mostly three-year
programs) or for the labor market. Students can also choose the vocational track, which
prepares them for the labor market. Both students’ preferences and scores in the first year
determine the track. If they perform well, they can choose between all tracks. Students
who fail on some courses may be excluded from certain programs or tracks. If they fail on
too many important courses, they can also be required to repeat a grade.10 While mobility
7We include all students going to Flemish schools in the analysis. Most of the schools are located in the
monolingual region of Flanders, but a few of them are located in the bilingual (French-Dutch) “Brussels-
Capital Region”, where Flemish families are a minority group.
8Capacity constraints were uncommon, but we cannot exclude that some schools were oversubscribed.
The Belgian constitution, however, protects free school choice and prevents schools from cream skimming.
If the school is capacity constrained, it must add students to a waiting list, and if places become available,
it must respect the order of this list.
9Officially the distinction between tracks exists only from the third year on (grade 9). However, at the
start of the second year, students decide on elective courses that prepare them for a particular track. We
therefore classify tracks from the second year on.
10At the end of each year, students obtain a certificate, based on their scores. They obtain an A-certificate
if they succeeded in all major courses. They can then move on to the next grade and continue the same
program. If they did not succeed in all courses, they might obtain a C-certificate which implies that they
have to repeat all courses of the previous grade. There is also a third possibility: a B-certificate. This implies
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between tracks is generally possible, we observe almost only downward mobility; that is,
students moving from the academic track to the technical or artistic tracks, and from the
technical or artistic tracks to the vocational track.11 Note that this mobility is not always
due to the restrictions of continuing in the same track but often results from a choice by
students or their parents: they want to avoid failing too many courses and thereby risk
accumulating a study delay in the future.
For each study program in each grade, the Flemish government sets out common learning
goals for students to achieve, and schools organize their curriculum accordingly. The supply
of these programs differs considerably between schools. Some schools specialize and offer
programs in only one track, while other schools offer programs in multiple tracks. According
to the tracks offered at schools, we can classify schools into two types. The first type of
schools are elite schools. They offer only programs in the academic track. The second type
of schools are non-elite schools. Most non-elite schools are multi-track schools and offer
programs in the academic track together with programs in other tracks. However, some
non-elite schools offer only programs in the technical, artistic and/or vocational track.12
Note that tracking decisions can be different in elite and non-elite schools because students
in elite schools are required to switch to another school when they want to downgrade from
the academic track. Even though students are free to switch between schools, it is likely
that many of them prefer not to.
2.2 A first look at the data
We use a rich dataset provided by the Flemish Ministry of Education. We observe all
students who started in the comprehensive program in secondary education in 2003 and
2004.13 We follow these students in secondary education and observe them during six years
if they graduate within the minimal duration of the program or during nine years at most if
they graduate after some delay. For every school year, we observe their school and program.
that they can move on to the next grade but only if they switch to a lower-ranked program. Alternatively,
they can decide to repeat a grade instead.
11Only mobility from the vocational track to other tracks is not allowed but, in general, it is also difficult
to move upwards from other tracks because students do not have the prerequisites for courses in the higher
tracks.
12Our results do not change when we exclude the second type of non-elite schools from the analysis (see
Supporting Information Appendix B).
13There are 144,873 students in these cohorts in our dataset. We keep the 121,746 students who start in
the comprehensive program. We then remove some students for whom we do not observe characteristics or
location to end up with a database of 111,571 students. Supporting Information Appendix A provides more
details about the data selection process.
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We also observe when they obtain a high school degree and the years of study delay.
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of students and their neighborhood in the two
types of schools. It shows that 26.7% of all students start at an elite school. 48.6% of the
students starting at elite schools are boys, while this is 49.9% at non-elite schools. Students
who had repeated at least one year before starting at secondary education are less likely to
choose an elite school. Grade repetition can be interpreted as a proxy for ability because
students who do not meet the minimum standards can be required to repeat a grade during
kindergarten or primary education. Socioeconomic status also determines school choice.
Disadvantaged students are less likely to start at elite schools. The most notable effect is for
the educational level of the mother. In elite schools, 55.8% of students has a mother with a
higher education degree, while this is only 32.4% in non-elite schools.
The following panel shows neighborhood characteristics at the level of the municipal-
ity and at the level of the statistical sector. In Belgium, each municipality is divided into
several statistical sectors.14 Statistical sectors are created in such a way that they split
each municipality into homogeneous neighborhoods. Aggregate characteristics at the level
of the statistical sector thus reflect the residential neighborhood, while characteristics at the
level of the municipality capture amenities in a broader region. Both types of character-
istics are important because they control for social segregation in specific neighborhoods.
Most neighborhood characteristics are measured in 2001, before students enroll in secondary
education.15
Table 1 shows that students who attend elite schools live in municipalities with a higher
median income. This difference is larger at the level of the statistical sector. This can be
explained by the fact that statistical sectors are more homogeneous than municipalities. The
share of individuals with the Belgian nationality in the neighborhood is similar for students
attending elite and non-elite schools. Students attending elite schools live in statistical areas
where 29.7% of the population has a degree in higher education, while this is only 25.1%
for students attending non-elite schools. Finally, average population density is higher for
students attending elite schools because relatively more elite schools are located in cities.16
We will control for these characteristics throughout the paper. Furthermore, we will control
for fixed effects for each of the five provinces and for each level of urbanization of the
14Belgium consists of 581 municipalities and 19,781 statistical sectors (Vademecum Statistische sectoren,
2012). Statistical sectors have a surface of 1.5 km² and 539 inhabitants, on average.
15Income is measured in 2004 but since all students would still be required to attend school at this time,
there is no problem of reverse causality.
16Note that population density at the statistical sector and at the level of the municipality are two different
measures that cannot be compared. A lower average population density at the level of the municipality can
be explained by the fact that there are large statistical sectors with few inhabitants.
9
Table 1: Enrollment in elite and non-elite schools
Elite school Non-elite school
Total enrollment 26.7% 73.3%
Characteristics of students
Gender Male 48.6% 49.9%
Female 51.4% 50.1%
Repeated during primary school Yes 6.0% 13.1%
No 94.0% 86.9%
Degree of the mother Higher education degree 55.8% 32.4%
High school degree 32.8% 43.1%
No high school degree 11.4% 24.5%
Language at home Dutch 94.3% 95.1%
Other language 5.7% 4.9%
Household income High incomea 85.9% 78.5%
Low income 14.1% 21.5%
Neighborhood characteristics of students (average)
Median household income Municipality 19.9 19.7
(in 1000 euro) Statistical sector 20.8 20.1
Belgian nationality Municipality 95.6% 95.8%
Statistical sector 96.0% 96.1%
Higher education degree Municipality 28.0% 25.4%
Statistical sector 29.7% 25.1%
High school degree Municipality 29.6% 30.2%
Statistical sector 29.6% 30.5%
No high school degree Municipality 42.4% 44.4%
Statistical sector 40.7% 44.4%
Population density (in 100 Municipality 8.2 6.6
inhabitants per km²) Statistical sector 26.7 23.4
Distance to school (km, average)
Distance to closest elite school 3.3 5.4
Distance to closest non-elite school 2.4 2.3
Observations 29,762 81,809
Note: 111,571 students starting secondary education in 2003 or 2004. Percentages are conditional on
school choice. Median household income is measured in 2004 and other neighborhood characteristics
are measured in 2001.
aNot eligible for study grant.
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municipality (using four categories). We also observe the location of students and schools.17
Average distances to both types of schools are small (2 to 5 km) and the average distance
to elite schools is smaller for the group of students actually choosing an elite school (3 km
instead of 5 km).18
Table 2 shows the track choice in the second year and the outcome variables that we
consider in the analysis. 93.6% of students who started at an elite school enrolled in the
Table 2: Track choice and study outcomes by initial school choice
Elite school Non-elite school
Academic track in grade 8 93.6% 55.3%
High school diploma 94.3% 90.8%
High school diploma without study delay 77.5% 70.0%
Downgradinga 27.1% 35.5%
Observations 29,762 81,809
Note: 111,571 students starting secondary education in 2003 or 2004. Percentages
are conditional on school choice.
aDummy variable equal to 1 when a student switches from a high to a low track
during secondary education.
academic track in the second year of secondary education, while this is only 55.3% for
students starting in non-elite schools. Note that students in elite schools have to leave the
school if they want to start in a non-academic track.
Our main outcome variable is graduating from high school. We define this variable by
looking at the data for these students until 2011 (cohort of 2003) and 2012 (cohort of 2004).
Since it takes a minimum of six years to graduate from high school, we allow for up to three
years of study delay.19 Students who started at elite schools perform better: 94.3% of the
students who started in their first year at an elite school graduate from high school, while
17We observe the location of the students at the level of the statistical sector. We compute the distance
from the center of the statistical sector to the exact location of the school.
18Both types of schools are within commuting distance for almost all students. Distance to a non-elite
school is 2.4 km, on average, with a standard deviation of only 1.9 km. Distances to elite schools are greater:
4.8 km, on average, with a standard deviation of 3.8 km. Nevertheless, at the 95th percentile, there is still
a reasonable distance to travel of 11.6 km.
190.3% of the students are still enrolled in secondary education in the last year of our dataset and have not
yet obtained their degree at the end of this year. We consider them as drop-outs in the main analysis. We
obtain similar results when omitting these students or assigning them to the group of high school graduates
(see Supporting Information Appendix B).
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only 90.8% of the students who started at a non-elite school eventually graduate. We also
consider an alternative outcome: graduating from high school without a study delay (i.e.,
within the theoretical duration of six years). Study delay is common because only 77.5% of
students starting in elite schools and 70.0% of students starting in a non-elite school graduate
on time. Finally, downgrading (i.e., a switch from a higher to a lower track) is more common
in non-elite schools: 35.5%, compared to only 27.1% in elite schools. As for the initial track
choice, downgrading also requires switching to a different school for students in elite schools.
In general, we conclude that students choosing elite schools are more likely to start at
the academic track, less likely to downgrade and more likely to graduate from high school,
but enrollment in elite schools is not random. Therefore, we need to control for self-selection
in order to investigate the causal effects of an elite school.
3 Empirical framework
We study the causal effect of starting at an elite school on obtaining a high school degree. To
address the potential self-selection of high ability students in elite schools, we use distance as
an instrument for school choice. In this section, we first specify a standard potential outcome
framework. We then discuss how to use this model to build a semi-parametric estimator for
the average treatment effects, using the Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE) framework of
Heckman and Vytlacil (2005).20 Next, we show how parametric and distributional assump-
tions can overcome common support problems of the semi-parametric approach and how the
factor structure of Aakvik et al. (2005) provides additional insights into the distribution of
treatment effects.
3.1 Potential outcomes
Let Y1i be the study outcome of student i in the case of treatment, starting at an elite school
(Di = 1), and Y0i the outcome of student i if he starts at a non-elite school (Di = 0). For
each student i, we observe only the realized outcome Yi in the observed state:
Yi = DiY1i + (1−Di)Y0i (1)
with Y1i = µ1(Xi, U1i) the outcome in case of treatment (going to an elite school), and
Y0i = µ0(Xi, U0i) in the case of no treatment. Xi is a vector of observed characteristics of
students and U0i and U1i are unobserved random variables.
20See also Cornelissen et al. (2016) for an overview on how to apply this method.
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Let selection into treatment be given by
Di = 1(Vi ≤ µD(Xi, Zi)) (2)
with 1() an indicator function = 1 if the expression between brackets is true, µD(Xi, Zi) an
arbitrary function of observed characteristics Xi and an instrument Zi. Vi is the unobserved
cost of treatment for student i with FV its cumulative distribution function. We can then
apply a probability normalization such that Di = 1(UDi ≤ P (Xi, Zi)) with P (Xi, Zi) ≡
FV (µD(Xi, Zi)) the propensity score and UDi ≡ FV (Vi) an unobserved cost of treatment that
is uniformly distributed on the unit interval, regardless of the distribution of V .21 Our main
interest is in the Average Treatment Effect: ATE = E[Y1i − Y0i], the Average Treatment
effect on the Treated: ATT = E[Y1i − Y0i|Di = 1] and the Average Treatment effect on the
Non-Treated: ATNT = E[Y1i − Y0i|Di = 0].
3.2 Semi-parametric estimation of average treatment effects
To allow for heterogeneous effects, we follow the framework of Heckman and Vytlacil (2005)
by using Marginal Treatment Effects (MTEs) as a building block for constructing the ATT,
ATE and ATNT. The MTE is the effect of attending an elite school for students with
observable characteristics Xi = x and unobserved cost of treatment UDi = uD:
MTE(x, uD) = E[Y1i − Y0i|Xi = x, UDi = uD].
We can interpret the treatment effect at low values of uD as the effect for students who
have a low unobserved cost; that is, a high unobserved preference for attending an elite
school. The effect at high values is the effect for students with high unobserved costs, or low
unobserved preferences. A weighted average of the MTEs then yields estimates of the ATE,
ATT and ATNT (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005).
As explained in Cornelissen et al. (2016), the minimal set of assumptions we need for
MTE estimation is similar to the set of assumptions needed for the LATE interpretation of
the 2SLS estimator (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). In section 4 we discuss the validity of these
assumptions in the context of our application based on empirical evidence. In the rest of the
paper, we maintain the following assumptions on the instrument Zi:
Condition 1 (Relevance) Zi is a random variable such that the propensity score P (Xi, Zi)
is a nontrivial function of Zi.
21While a specific distribution is not imposed, we do require the distribution to be absolutely continuous
with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
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Condition 2 (Independence) (U0i, U1i, UDi) are independent of Zi conditional on Xi.
The first condition assures that the instrument is relevant in the school choice. The second
condition assures that the instrument has no direct impact on study outcomes. Vytlacil
(2002) also notes that the selection model in (2) is equivalent to the monotonicity condition
of the LATE literature. In our context, this means that students should perceive distance
to school as a cost and not as a benefit.
Estimation of the MTE can then proceed using local IV by determining how Yi changes
with P (Xi = x, Zi = z) in small neighborhoods around each value of P (x, z) (Heckman and
Vytlacil, 1999). To identify the entire MTE(x, uD) function, we need common support, i.e.
we need sufficient observations of both treated and non-treated students at each value of
P (x, z). To achieve this, we follow a semi-parametric approach where the control variables
enter the outcome equation linearly, but the functional form of the MTE curve (across control
variables) is not restricted (see Section 4.3 in Cornelissen et al. (2016)).
In Section 4, we show that we can identify MTE(x, uD) for all uD ≤ 0.81.22 This allows
us to interpret how the costs of treatment relate to treatment outcomes for students with
low costs, or high preferences, of attending an elite school. This is sufficient to estimate the
ATT because the weights in the calculation of the ATT are 0 for uD > 0.81.
23 Nevertheless,
this approach does not allow estimation of the ATNT and ATE with our data. We therefore
discuss a model that introduces functional form and distributional assumptions.
3.3 Parametric estimation of average treatment effects
We follow Manski et al. (1992) and impose parametric and distributional assumptions to
model treatment and potential outcomes. The structure is sufficiently flexible to allow for
heterogeneous treatment effects and does not impose the structure of a Roy model, that is,
students do not need to select on gains of treatment. We use the following functional form
assumptions:
Di = 1(γZi + δXi − Vi ≥ 0), (3)
Y0i = 1(β0Xi − U0i ≥ 0),
Y1i = 1(β1Xi − U1i ≥ 0),
22We estimate the model in STATA using the user-written command ’mtefe’ (Andresen, 2018).
23Equation (28) in Cornelissen et al. (2016) shows that we can calculate the ATT as follows: ATT =
1
N
∑N
i=1
pi
p¯ Xi(β1−β0) +
∑100
u=1
Pr(pi>u/100)
100p¯ E(Ui1−Ui0|UiD = u/100) with pi the predicted propensity score
for i and E(Ui1−Ui0|UiD = u/100) the unobserved component of the MTE. We find that Pr(pi > u/100) is
approximately 0 for all u > 81.
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with γ, δ, β0 and β1 parameters to estimate. The model is then completed by assuming
a distribution of U1i, U0i and Vi. We assume that the error terms are jointly normal with a
mean-zero vector and correlation matrix Ω:
Ω =
 1 ρ0 ρ11 ρ10
1
 . (4)
Because Y1i and Y0i are never observed simultaneously, the joint distribution of (U1i, U0i)
and thus their correlation ρ10 is not identified. We can however estimate correlations between
U0i and Vi: ρ0 and between U1i and Vi: ρ1.
24 Since the joint distribution of each outcome
equation and the selection equation is identified, we have sufficient information to calculate
the ATE, ATT and ATNT for each value of x (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2011). We then integrate
over its empirical distribution to construct the overall averages. This model also allows us
to identify average marginal effects by calculating how the treatment effects differ when one
of the covariates changes value, keeping the other covariates constant.
3.4 Factor model and distributional treatment effects
While ρ10 was not needed for average effects, it is necessary to know more about the dis-
tribution of treatment effects. In particular, we are interested in the proportion of students
experiencing positive or negative treatment effects. Aakvik et al. (2005) show that iden-
tification can be achieved by imposing a factor structure on the error terms.25 Aakvik et
al. (2005) follow a similar structure as in (3), but instead of directly estimating covariances
between error terms, they impose the following structure:
Vi = −θi + εDi, (5)
U0i = −α0θi + ε0i,
U1i = −α1θi + ε1i,
with θ, εD, ε0 and ε1 all independently distributed (e.g. N(0, 1)); that is, correlation
between error terms enters exclusively through one common factor, θi. This imposes the
24We estimate the model in STATA using the user-written command ’switch probit’ (Lokshin and Sajaia,
2011).
25The non-identification of ρ10 was also addressed by Poirier and Tobias (2003) without imposing a factor
model. They make use of an algorithm in Koop and Poirier (1997), who use the restrictions that come from
the positive definiteness of the covariance matrix of the error terms to learn about the value of ρ10. The
authors use a Bayesian procedure to estimate its distribution but warn that the results can depend on the
prior that is chosen for ρ10.
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restriction that correlation between unobservables of the potential outcomes of both school
options are driven by the same underlying reason for choosing the school. θi can, for example,
be interpreted as unobserved ability of the student or the social status of the family. If the
strongest students select into treatment, we should see α0 > 0 and α1 > 0. With selection
on gains, we would have α1 > α0. However, if unobserved preferences for treatment are
correlated with behavior that reduces the outcome, we can have α1 < α0, with α1 possibly
negative. An alternative interpretation of θi is that it captures the local quality of schools. If,
for many students, the local elite and non-elite school are of similar quality but for some the
elite school is better, we would expect α1 > α0 if students in these neighborhoods are more
likely to attend an elite school (i.e., having higher values of θi). With normally distributed
θ, εD, ε0 and ε1, the model is identical to the one we proposed in the previous subsection with
ρj =
αj√
2
√
1+α2j
for j ∈ {0, 1}.26 The previously unidentified correlation, ρ10, is now identified,
as it only depends on the two factor loadings: ρ10 =
α0α1√
1+α20
√
1+α21
= 2ρ0ρ1. This identity can
then be used to calculate distributional treatment effects.27 Note that this factor structure
was only needed to identify ρ10 and therefore has no impact on the estimates of the ATT,
ATNT, ATE, or marginal effects.
To estimate this model, we proceed as follows: we first estimate (3) with error structure
(4) using maximum likelihood to calculate the ATT, ATNT, ATE, and the average marginal
effects of observed characteristics. We then apply the additional structure on the error terms
(5) to calculate distributional treatment effects.
4 Instrument validity
We use the relative distance to an elite school as an instrument for school choice. We
define the relative distance as the distance to the closest non-elite high school, subtracted
by the distance to the closest elite high school. The use of geographical variation as an
instrument for school choice has been proposed by Card (1995) and has also been used more
recently in the educational literature (see, for example, Barrow et al. (2015), Carneiro et
al. (2016) and Nybom (2017)). In this section, we provide a discussion of the assumptions
of the instrument: relevance, independence and common support. Note also that a fourth
26Note that normalizations are different. Instead of (implicitly) normalizing the variances of Vi, U0i, and
U1i to be 1, the model of Aakvik et. al (2005) implies variances of respectively 2, α
2
0 + 1 and α
2
1 + 1; that is,
our estimates should be multiplied by the square roots of these numbers to translate them to their model.
27With the three correlation parameters identified, we can take draws from the estimated error distribution,
calculate the potential outcomes and simulate treatment effects. We also directly estimate the factor model
using the ’gsem’ command in STATA and obtain identical results for the treatment effects.
16
assumption, monotonicity, was implied by the selection model (2). This implies that all
students must perceive distance as a cost and not as a benefit.
4.1 Relevance
The first assumption implies that distance should have a strong impact on school choice.
Table 3 shows the results of the first stage of a 2SLS regression.
Table 3: First stage: choosing an elite school
(1) (2)
Variables Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Relative distance 0.024* (0.001) 0.024* (0.001)
Mother no high school degreea -0.181* (0.004)
Mother high school degreea -0.123* (0.003)
No Dutch at home 0.063* (0.007)
Low income -0.029* (0.003)
Male -0.011* (0.003)
Repeated -0.121* (0.004)
Neighborhood characteristics yes yes
Observations 111,571 111,571
R-squared 0.131 0.169
F-stat excl. instr. 867 878
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector. Neighborhood
characteristics include population density, median household income, the share of Belgians
and average educational level at the municipality and the statistical sector. Both regressions
additionally control for province fixed effects and indicators for the level of urbanization of
the municipality.
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
The first specification only controls for the neighborhood characteristics summarized in
Table 1, fixed effects for each of the five provinces and for each level of urbanization of the
municipality. The second specification additionally controls for student characteristics. By
controlling for neighborhood characteristics, we allow for the fact that parents’ location pref-
erences might not be independent from their children’s performance. The relative distance
has the expected positive sign and is highly significant, resulting in a high F-statistic of the
exclusion restriction. Students (or their parents) are sensitive to distances to schools when
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making the choice to attend an elite high school as an additional kilometer to a non-elite
high school (or an equal reduction in the distance to the elite school) makes them 2.4 per-
centage points more likely to choose the elite school. This estimate does not change when
controlling for observed student characteristics (which is what we would expect from a valid
instrument). The control variables do already indicate that selection into elite schools is
non-random, as disadvantaged students are less likely to choose an elite school. The only
exception is students who do not speak Dutch at home, as they are more likely to choose an
elite school but they also have lower expected outcomes.28
4.2 Independence
The second condition (independence) implies that differences in distances must be indepen-
dent from unobservables in the outcome equation. First, we argue, based on institutional
grounds, that distance to schools is an exogenous instrument for school choice in Flanders.
Second, we show that in our main specification, distances are not correlated with observed
student characteristics.
While distances can be problematic in a number of institutional contexts, we argue that
this is not the case in Flanders.29 Unrestricted school choice is protected by the Belgian
constitution (art. 24, §1) and most students live close to several schools. They can choose
between 667 schools in Flanders of which 131 are elite schools. For the median student, six
schools are located within a 5 km distance.30 Students can also benefit from inexpensive
public transportation or cycle lanes, the most common means of transportation for high
school students. Parents are still expected to take neighborhood characteristics into account
when moving. These characteristics might be correlated with the presence of an elite school.
Controlling for neighborhood characteristics addresses this concern.
For distance to be a valid instrument, it should be independent from unobserved student
characteristics. Although we cannot exclude that travel distance could still be correlated
with unobserved student characteristics, it would be reassuring if it is not correlated with
observed student characteristics. In Table 4, we show the results of an OLS regression of rela-
28A possible explanation is that this variable groups students from very diverse migrant backgrounds, both
low and high skilled, and is therefore difficult to interpret. While low skilled migration was very common in
Flanders for industrial production during the 20th century, high skilled migration is also important because
of Flanders’ proximity to Brussels, the capital of the European Union.
29Altonji et al. (2005) show that distance is not a valid instrument by which to identify the effect of
attending a Catholic high school using data from the US.
30In Supporting Information Appendix B, we show that our main results are similar when we restrict the
sample to students who have at least four schooling options in a 5 km radius and who have an elite school
among the four closest options.
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tive distance on student characteristics. After conditioning on neighborhood characteristics,
student characteristics are not correlated with relative distance. A joint significance test is
strongly rejected, and each covariate is precisely estimated around 0. The largest impact we
find is for parental education: students with a mother without a high school degree live 55
m further from an elite school than students with a mother with a higher education degree.
This is a very short distance, precisely estimated, but still only significantly different from
0 at the 10% level. We conclude that after controlling for neighborhood characteristics, we
do not find evidence of selection into neighborhoods with elite schools based on observed
student characteristics.31
Table 4: Regression of relative distance on student characteristics
Variables Coef. St. error
Mother no high school degreea -0.055 (0.033)
Mother high school degreea -0.023 (0.024)
No Dutch at home 0.040 (0.062)
Low income -0.046 (0.030)
Male -0.010 (0.019)
Repeated -0.025 (0.032)
Neighborhood characteristics yes
F-test individual characteristics 1.28 (p=0.263)
Observations 111,571
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector.
Neighborhood characteristics include population density, median household
income, the share of Belgians and average educational level at the municipality
and the statistical sector. The regression additionally controls for province fixed
effects and indicators for the level of urbanization of the municipality.
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
31Supporting Information Appendix C shows that it is particularly important to control for intraregional
differences, captured by dummy variables for the provinces and the levels of urbanization. When we do
not control for neighborhood characteristics, the effect of student characteristics on travel distance is larger
and significant. This is because we find that academic outcomes are lower in urban areas. At the same
time, distances to different types of schools are smaller in urban areas, which implies that elite schools are
more accessible for students living in cities. Not controlling for neighborhood characteristics then leads to a
downward bias in the estimates of the treatment effects.
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4.3 Common support
This last condition implies that for each value of the propensity score P (x, z), there should be
treated and non-treated individuals. This condition is needed only for the semi-parametric
approach. We estimate the propensity score using a probit regression and plot the histogram
of common support in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Common support
Note: This figure plots the number of treated and non-treated students for each
percentile of the propensity score (111,571 students).
The common support assumption is satisfied for values of P (x, z) up until 0.81. For
higher values of P (x, z), there are almost no treated or non-treated students and the MTE
cannot be identified.32 This allows us to compute the ATT because the weights in the
calculation of the ATT become 0 for uD > 0.81.
33 Therefore, we do not need estimates of
the MTE for uD > 0.81 and thus we do not need common support at P (x, z) > 0.81. We
plot the weights in Figure D1 in Supporting Information Appendix D. The ATT attaches
more weight to students with low costs of treatment (low uD) as they are more likely to
select into treatment.
32Each percentile up until 0.81 contains at least 10 treated and 10 non-treated students. For most per-
centiles above 0.81, this condition is not satisfied so we do not report an MTE here.
33In practice, the weights are non-zero but very small (see Figure D1).
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5 Empirical results
Before discussing the heterogeneity of the treatment effect, we briefly discuss the results of
OLS and 2SLS regressions that ignore heterogeneity in the treatment effect (see Supporting
Information Appendix D, Table D1). OLS finds a positive effect from treatment, (i.e.,
students would, on average, be more likely to graduate from high school if they choose an elite
school), but this effect decreases when controlling for background characteristics. When we
control for self-selection with a 2SLS regression, but ignore heterogeneous treatment effects,
the 2SLS estimate turns out to be statistically insignificant.
5.1 Estimation results
We estimate both a semi-parametric and parametric model, as explained in Section 3. For
the semi-parametric model, we show the estimation results of the observable part of the
treatment effect in Table D2 in Supporting Information Appendix D. In Figure 2, we plot
the unobservable part; that is, the MTE curve.34 On the horizontal axis, we present uD.
Students with a low uD have a low unobserved cost (or a high unobserved preference) for elite
schools and are therefore more likely to be treated. Figure 2 shows that the treatment effect
remains constant and almost never significantly differs from zero. This does not mean that
treatment effects are constant. Many of the control variables are capturing heterogeneity
in returns. As expected from the MTE curve, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no unob-
served heterogeneity in the treatment effect (p-value =0.424) but we strongly reject this on
observables (p-value = 0.000).
Table D3 in Supporting Information Appendix D contains the estimates of the paramet-
ric model. Here we find a statistically significant impact of unobservables. The unobservable
in the non-treated outcome is positively correlated with the unobservable in the selection
equation (ρ0 = 0.193). This is consistent with the idea that stronger students select into elite
schools. However, for the treated outcome we find a negative correlation (ρ1 = −0.185).35
This suggests that these stronger students lose their advantage by attending an elite school.
Note that the unobserved factor captures only what observable characteristics fail to explain
in the correlation between preferences for elite schools and high school graduation. A poten-
tial explanation for the different sign of ρ0 and ρ1 is that an important number of students
with a high preference for elite schools is at risk of not being able to pursue the academic
34The bandwidths of the local polynomial regressions are determined by the asymptotically optimal con-
stant bandwidth (Fan and Gijbels, 1996).
35As explained in section 3.4, we can also use these correlations to identify the factor loadings in the model
of Aakvik et al. (2005): α0 = 0.283 and α1 = −0.271.
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Figure 2: Obtaining a high school degree: MTE
Note: MTEs are calculated based on 111,571 students using a local polynomial
regression of degree 2 with an Epanechnikov kernel. Standard errors are computed
with a bootstrap procedure (250 replications) and clustered within the statistical
sector. P-value no observable heterogeneity (0.000), p-value no unobservable
heterogeneity (0.424).
track. They could have above average ability, leading to better outcomes in non-elite schools.
At the same time, they are not top performers implying that they have a risk of failing in the
academic track. This can have detrimental effects on the probability to graduate from high
school if their high preference makes them unwilling to switch to another school. In section
6 we investigate the interaction between school and track choice and find further evidence
for this explanation.36
5.2 Average and distributional treatment effects
ATT, ATNT and ATE
36Reverse selection on unobserved gains is not uncommon in the literature as it has also been established
in Aakvik et al. (2005) on the effects of a rehabilitation program on employment and Cornelissen et al.
(2018) on the effects of universal child care on school outcomes.
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Table 5 compares the estimates of the average treatment effects of the semi-parametric
and parametric model. In order to be able to compute these three different treatment effects
with the semi-parametric approach, the common support assumption should be satisfied.
In general, this assumption is difficult to satisfy, but we are able to identify a statistically
insignificant ATT of 0.4 percentage points. This implies that, on average, students in elite
schools do not experience an effect on the probability of graduating from high school.
Table 5: Obtaining a high school degree: average treatment effects
Semi-parametric approach Parametric approach
Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
ATT 0.004 (0.019) -0.016 (0.008)
ATNT Not identifieda 0.051* (0.010)
ATE Not identifieda 0.033* (0.008)
Note: Average treatment effects are calculated based on 111,571 students. Standard
errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector and computed with a
bootstrap procedure using 250 replications.
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
a Not identified due to insufficient common support.
As explained in Section 3.3, we also impose a parametric structure. Despite the extra
structure, we still obtain a statistically insignificant ATT (−1.6 percentage points). The
parametric model also allows us to compute the ATE and ATNT. We derive a significantly
positive ATE of 3.3 percentage points and a larger ATNT of 5.1 percentage points. These
results imply that students who do not attend elite schools would, on average, be 5.1 per-
centage points more likely to graduate from high school when they would have chosen an
elite school, while students who attend elite schools do not, on average, experience an effect
from treatment.37
Average marginal effects of student characteristics
The average treatment effects can still mask a lot of heterogeneity within both groups of
treated and non-treated students. To investigate this further, we consider the effect of ob-
37We repeated the analysis with an alternative outcome variable: obtaining a high school degree without
study delay (i.e., within six years of studying). Other studies have found that grade retention has a negative
effect on performance in the final years of high school (Cockx et al., 2018) and on the student’s beginning-of-
career wage (Brodaty et al., 2013). Similar to our main outcome, we obtain a statistically insignificant ATT
but we find even stronger positive effects for the ATNT. The results can be found in Supporting Information
Appendix D Tables D4, D5 and D6, and the MTE in Figure D2.
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servable characteristics and calculate distributional treatment effects. We report the average
marginal effects of each background variable in Table 6, as computed from the parametric
model. They report the change in the ATE when the value of the control variable changes
from 0 to 1 for all individuals in the sample. As these effects differ between individuals, we
evaluate them for each student in the sample at their actual realizations of all other variables
and report the mean effect.
Table 6: Obtaining a high school degree: average marginal effects and distributional effects
Coef. St. error
Average marginal effects of student background
Mother has no high school degreea 0.049* (0.010)
Mother has high school degreea 0.014* (0.005)
No Dutch at home -0.011 (0.008)
Low income -0.005 (0.004)
Male 0.010 (0.006)
Repeated 0.028* (0.012)
Distributional treatment effectsb
Among all students
% benefit from elite school 7.232* (0.239)
% suffer from elite school 3.941* (0.616)
Among students in elite school
% benefit from elite school 3.680* (0.702)
% suffer from elite school 5.220* (0.176)
Among student in non-elite school
% benefit from elite school 8.549* (0.233)
% suffer from elite school 3.468* (0.837)
Note: Average marginal effects and distributional treatment effects are calculated based on
111,571 students. Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector
and computed with a bootstrap procedure using 250 replications. Average marginal effects
of control variables report the change in the ATE when the value of the control variable
would change from 0 to 1. Distributional effects calculated by simulating the error terms of
the potential outcome framework (100 draws for each student).
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
b Requires identification of ρ10 using factor structure Aakvik et al. (2005).
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The average marginal effects are suggestive of reverse selection on gains. Table 6 shows
that choosing an elite school has larger positive effects for students whose mother did not
complete high school and students who repeated at least one grade in primary school. How-
ever, these students are less likely to choose an elite school (see Table D3 in Supporting
Information Appendix D for estimates of the selection equation). As explained before, the
estimates also reveal such a pattern for unobservables. An example that is consistent with
this story is that of a low ability student from a high social class who is strongly encouraged
by his parents to attend an elite school but would be more likely to graduate from high school
when choosing a non-elite school. The reverse is also possible. High ability students with a
low social status might not choose an elite school, even if they would be more successful in
this type of school. As we find the strongest marginal effects for the educational level of the
mother (a proxy for social status), we believe this is a plausible story.
Distributional treatment effects
The extra structure imposed by the factor model of Aakvik et al. (2005) is necessary
(only) to compute distributional treatment effects. Distributional treatment effects are an-
other measure of the heterogeneity of the treatment effect and identify the fraction of students
who experience or would have experienced (in case of no treatment) a positive or negative
treatment effect. The second panel of Table 6 shows the distributional treatment effects for
the total population of students, the group of students who started at elite schools and the
group of students who started at non-elite schools. In total, 7.2% of students experience a
positive treatment effect. Note that the treatment effect is large, as it involves a switch from
not obtaining a degree to obtaining a degree (or vice versa); that is, 7.2% of students would
obtain a degree at an elite school but not at a non-elite school. A smaller fraction of 3.9%
would graduate from high school only if they started at a non-elite school. Among the group
of treated students, we compute that 5.2% of students experience a negative treatment effect
and that only 3.7% experience gains from attending an elite school. This is consistent with
our previous findings that show that students in non-elite schools would experience the most
positive treatment effects. Among the group of students in non-elite schools, 8.5% would
experience a positive treatment effect, while only 3.5% would lose from attending an elite
school. According to this outcome, we can conclude that 7.6% of students would have been
better off in the other school type.38
The fact that students can be negatively affected by an elite school is not new. Pop-
Eleches and Urquiola (2013) find that parents reduce their effort when their child enters an
38This is the result of a weighted sum: 5.2% of the 26.7% in elite schools suffer, while 8.5% of the 73.3%
in non-elite schools would gain.
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elite school. They also find that relatively weak students in better-ranked schools feel more
marginalized and insecure than similar students in other schools. A negative effect can also
be explained by differences in grading standards and demands from students. Schools have
some autonomy in deciding about grade progression and excluding students from certain
programs. It is therefore possible that elite schools more often require weaker students
to repeat a grade in order to achieve the required schooling level, which could demotivate
students and therefore result in drop out.
Another potential explanation for the heterogeneity in the effects is that elite schools differ
from non-elite schools in their supply of tracks. If students are not aware of their ability
from the start of high school, a wrong track choice may occur. This could be problematic
when they are in an elite school as it makes it more difficult to switch to a lower ranked
track. We will explore this channel further in Section 6.
6 Explaining heterogeneity in the treatment effect by
track choices
In this section, we explain our two main findings. First, attending an elite school, on average,
increases degree completion, but only for the non-treated students. This implies that there
is a reverse selection on gains. Second, there is substantial heterogeneity within each school
type, which implies that a substantial fraction of students in both elite and non-elite schools
experience a positive or negative treatment effect from attending an elite school.
We explain these results by extending the factor model of Section 3.4 with the track choice
that students make in the second year of high school (grade 8).39 We then use this model to
isolate the effect of the tracking decision by simulating the track choice that students would
make in each type of school. First, we find that choosing an elite school raises the likelihood
of enrolling in the academic track. Second, elite schools make students more likely to persist
and succeed in this track. Third, this is the case only for non-treated students as treated
students tend to enroll in the academic track, independent of the type of school they choose
in the first year. This can explain why the ATNT is more positive than the ATT. Finally,
we find that treated students are negatively affected by an elite school if they are not able
to pursue the academic track. Their preference for elite schools makes them unwilling to
switch to another school in order to choose a lower ranked track, which could help them
39As explained in Section 2, the “official” track distinction starts a year later (grade 9) but study programs
in grade 8 are already aligned with the track. We therefore also show the results using the track in grade 9
instead and find similar effects (see Supporting Information Appendix D, Table D9 and Table D10).
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avoid study delay and dropout. In the last part of this section, we provide further evidence
for this by repeating our main analysis on the probability to downgrade.
6.1 Endogenous tracking decisions
Entering the academic track is given by an indicator Aji = 1(σjZ
track
i + κjXi − U trackji ≥ 0),
with j = 0 when i entered a non-elite school and j = 1 if i entered an elite school. Track
choices therefore depend on the same set of covariates Xi that affect the choice of the
type of school, but also the relative distance to the nearest school that offers the academic
track Ztracki .
40 We further extend the model to have four instead of two potential outcomes
(conditional on each school type and track).41 The error terms are still generated by a factor
model. The impact of the unobserved factor θi on all error terms is estimated through factor
loadings and the remaining variation is captured by independent shocks that are normally
distributed.
The estimates can be found in Supporting Information Appendix D, Tables D7 and D8.
Table 7 shows the estimated treatment effects of the model. First, we show the treatment
effects of choosing an elite school on degree completion in secondary education according
to this model. As expected, endogenizing the track decisions does not have an important
impact on the overall effect of attending an elite school, as we found in Table 5. Next, we find
that choosing the academic track raises the probability of graduating from high school for the
treated (+6.8 percentage points) and the non-treated (+4.5 percentage points). In contrast
to the treatment effects of elite schools, we do not see reverse selection on gains for this
treatment. Nevertheless, non-treated students would, on average, also gain from enrolling
in the academic track. Finally, we show that choosing an elite school makes students, on
average, 23.1 percentage points more likely to enroll in the academic track. This average
effect is largely driven by non-treated students whose impact is more than three times larger
than the impact for treated students. This can be explained by the correlation between
preferences for elite schools and preferences for the academic track.42 Many treated students
40We define Ztracki as the distance to the closest school that offers a non-academic track, subtracted by
the distance to the closest school that offers an academic track.
41We also add Ztracki as a covariate in the school choice equation to allow students to consider the distance
to the academic track when making their schooling decision. Note that the large number of neighborhood
characteristics we control for requires us to constrain some of their effects. We assume that the parameters
of neighborhood characteristics in the track choice equations do not depend on the initial school choice. As
in the baseline model, we allow their effects on the outcome to differ between both school choices, but we
restrict them to be the same over track choices. Note that we still allow individual characteristics (observed
and unobserved) to enter in a fully flexible way.
42Table D7 shows that observable characteristics predicting students to enroll in the elite school are the
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would enroll in the academic track in any case, while this is not true for the non-treated
students who are more encouraged to enroll in the academic track if they attended an elite
school.
Table 7: Extended model: average treatment effects
Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Treatment Elite school Academic track Elite school
Outcome High school degree High school degree Academic track
ATT -0.008 (0.007) 0.068* (0.014) 0.076* (0.008)
ATNT 0.049* (0.011) 0.045* (0.013) 0.287* (0.036)
ATE 0.033* (0.008) 0.061* (0.012) 0.231* (0.028)
Note: Average treatment effects are calculated based on 111,571 students. Standard errors are
corrected for clustering within the statistical sector and computed by sampling 250 draws from
the estimated distribution. For each draw of the estimates we calculate the treatment effects by
simulating the error terms of the potential outcome framework (100 draws for each student).
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
In our model, we allow for two channels through which elite schools can affect degree
completion. First, elite schools can have a direct effect on degree completion. This could be
related to better peers or teachers, for example. Second, elite schools encourage students to
start at the academic track and thereby make them more likely to obtain a degree. In Table
8, we isolate the direct effect of choosing an elite school by simulating degree completion for
treated and non-treated students, while keeping the track choice fixed.
same as those predicting them to enroll in the academic track. This pattern also holds for unobservables.
We find a factor loading of 0.870 for students in non-elite schools and 0.251 for students in elite schools. As
the factor loading of attending an elite school is normalized to 1, a positive load on the track choice points
to a positive correlation in unobserved preferences for elite schools and the academic track.
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Table 8: Extended model: average treatment effects conditional upon track choice
No restrictions Only academic track No academic track
Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
ATT -0.008 (0.007) -0.003 (0.006) -0.130* (0.036)
ATNT 0.049* (0.011) 0.042* (0.012) 0.000 (0.025)
ATE 0.033* (0.008) 0.030* (0.009) -0.035 (0.024)
Note: Average treatment effects are calculated based on 111,571 students. Standard errors are
corrected for clustering within the statistical sector and computed by sampling 250 draws from
the estimated distribution. For each draw of the estimates we calculate the treatment effects by
simulating the error terms of the potential outcome framework (100 draws for each student).
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
The results in the first column are again the estimated treatment effects of choosing an
elite school on high school graduation by our model when the track choice is not restricted.
The next two columns show the treatment effects of choosing an elite school conditional upon
track choice in the second year of high school. In the second specification, we simulate how
treatment effects would change if every student would enroll in the academic track. While the
ATT is identical to the baseline case, the ATNT is slightly smaller.43 In this simulation, elite
schools no longer incentivize students to enroll in the academic track because all students
now enroll in this track. The positive treatment effect for the non-treated suggests that elite
schools not only raise the probability to choose the academic track but also success in the
academic track.
Finally, we simulate how treatment effects would change when the academic track cannot
be chosen by students. Note that in this case, students enrolled in elite schools have to move
to another school after the first year, as only the academic track is offered at their initially
chosen school. While the non-treated experience no effect, we find a large and negative ATT
of -13.0 percentage points. This result shows that students with a high preference for elite
schools (the treated) suffer when they are not able to start at the academic track and have
to switch to a different school. For non-treated students this is less of an issue. They would
also need to switch schools but rather it would be a switch to their preferred school in any
case so it is not considered to be as costly.
43We also find a smaller ATNT when repeating our main analysis on the sample of students who choose
the academic track in the second grade of high school (see Supporting Information Appendix B).
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6.2 Downgrading
The model in the previous subsection shows the large impact of elite schools on the initial
track decision, as well as how treated and non-treated students react differently to the
non-availability of a track. In this section, we show that this initial response also persists
in the higher grades, by repeating our main analysis for an alternative outcome variable:
downgrading.
The estimates can be found in the Supporting Information Appendix D, Tables D11
and D12 and the MTE in Figure D3. From the estimated treatment effects in Table 9, we
can conclude that students with a high preference for elite schools are more prepared to
stay in the academic track if they attend an elite school. Students with lower preferences
experience no effect because they are more willing to change schools in order to switch
tracks. This can also be seen in the average marginal effects (see Table 10). For most
variables, such as low education of the mother and having repeated a grade in elementary
school, we see that students benefitting more from elite schools (see Table 6) are also the
ones who have positive marginal effects on the downgrading decisions. This implies that
the negative ATE on downgrading of -4.1 percentage points is mostly coming from students
who do not improve their chances of obtaining a high school degree, while students who do
experience improvements do not let their downgrading decision depend on it. In an elite
school, they make use of the opportunity to be more successful after choosing the academic
track (see previous subsection), but if they need to switch at a later date, they are still
willing to do so. Note that this high preference does not necessarily need to apply to the
student. They can also be strongly encouraged by their parents to attend and/or stay in an
elite school, even when teachers give the opposite advice.
Table 9: Downgrading: average treatment effects
Semi-parametric approach Parametric approach
Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
ATT -0.133* (0.021) -0.109* (0.020)
ATNT Not identifieda -0.016 (0.024)
ATE Not identifieda -0.041* (0.019)
Note: Average treatment effects are calculated based on 111,571 students. Standard
errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector and computed with a
bootstrap procedure using 250 replications.
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
a Not identified due to insufficient common support.
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These results suggest that it is important to reorient students to another track if they
perform less well during secondary education in order to avoid high school drop-out. This
finding is consistent with Dustmann et al. (2017), who find that the possibility to change
tracks over time is important in order to mitigate possible negative long-term effects of early
tracking.
Table 10: Downgrading: average marginal effects
Coef. St. error
Mother has no high school degreea 0.074* (0.016)
Mother has high school degreea 0.047* (0.011)
No Dutch at home -0.049* (0.015)
Low income 0.019* (0.009)
Male 0.062* (0.007)
Repeated 0.128* (0.014)
Note: Average marginal effects are calculated based on 111,571 students. Standard
errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector and computed with a
bootstrap procedure using 250 replications. Average marginal effects of control
variables report the change in the ATE when the value of the control variable would
change from 0 to 1.
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
7 Conclusion
We study the causal and heterogeneous impact of choosing an elite high school on high school
completion. Instead of offering study programs in different tracks, elite schools only offer
programs in the academic track. We apply our analysis to an early tracking system in the
region of Flanders in Belgium.
We find that there is substantial heterogeneity in the treatment effect, both within and
between treatment groups. On average, students are 3.3 percentage points more likely to
obtain a high school degree if they start at an elite school. However, students attending elite
schools experience, on average, no effect of treatment, while students who do not choose
an elite school would experience, on average, a significantly positive effect of 5.1 percentage
points. We also find that treatment effects are greater for students from disadvantaged
backgrounds who are less likely to choose an elite school. These findings imply that students
with the lowest preference for elite schools experience the greatest positive effects.
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Further analysis shows that this heterogeneity can be explained by tracking decisions.
Elite schools incentivize non-treated students to enroll and perform well in the academic
track, which increases their chances of obtaining a degree. Treated students are already
more likely to choose the academic track in both types of schools but instead have a higher
risk of being mismatched because their high preference for the elite school interferes with
their tracking decisions.
These results have important implications for educational policies for the region of Flan-
ders and for other countries that apply some form of tracking. First, the average positive
effects of elite schools imply that more students and especially students from disadvantaged
backgrounds, should be encouraged to enroll in schools that offer only an academic track.
More information about the capabilities of students to pursue an academic track could assist
those students from disadvantaged backgrounds in particular to opt more often for academic
high schools.
Second, the large heterogeneity in gains from elite and non-elite schools suggests that
students may benefit considerably from school variety. Countries should not follow a one
size fits all approach because allowing for different types of schools could improve degree
completion. Students should have the choice between different schooling options within
commuting distance. Countries that split students into different tracks through track-specific
schools would benefit from also offering schools that offer multiple tracks.
Third, the reverse selection on gains shows that students are not optimally choosing their
school. Thus, improved guidance or tests at the end of primary education may be useful.
Furthermore, students with a high preference for academic schools but who are not able to
pursue an academic track should be better guided towards other schools in order to prevent
them from dropping out. Countries that organize their secondary education in track-specific
schools could create clusters of different types of schools to smoothen the transition to other
tracks if students do not perform well in the academic track.
Our analysis is limited to outcomes in secondary education. Graduating from elite schools
could have benefits in higher education or on the labor market. Further research is needed
in order to consider the effects of elite schools on other outcomes, such as success in higher
education or on the labor market.
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Appendix A: Construction of the dataset
We obtained our main dataset from the Flemish Ministry of Education and observe informa-
tion on 72,292 and 72,581 students who started for the first time in the first year of secondary
education in 2003 and 2004, respectively. We observe students in administrative records until
2012 but we do not use the final year for the first cohort so that we observe students in both
cohorts during nine consecutive years. We only keep students who start at the comprehensive
program. In the first year, students can also start at a pre-vocational program. Students
starting at this program often did not successfully complete their secondary education and
therefore could not enroll in elite schools. This reduces our sample to 60,754 students in
2003 and 60,992 students in 2004. We also remove double entries, reducing the sample by 26
observations. Four students entered both an elite and non-elite school: we therefore remove
them completely. Next, we remove students who do not live in one of the Flemish provinces.
This reduces our sample to 59,092 and 59,824 students, respectively.44 Removing the obser-
vations with missing information about individual characteristics or detailed location reduces
the sample to 55,527 and 56,252 observations, respectively.
We combine these data with data on neighborhood characteristics at the municipal and
statistical sector level provided by ADSEI (now Statbel). From this data source, we use
median income, average educational level, share of inhabitants with Belgian nationality,
and population density. Most neighborhood characteristics are measured in 2001, before
students enroll in secondary education. Median income is measured in 2004 because this
is not available in the census of 2001. We merge the two datasets based on the statistical
sector. A limited number of students cannot be merged and our sample reduces to 55,434
and 56,137 students for 2003 and 2004, respectively.
We observe for each student the study program in each year and the track as from grade 9.
The track distinction does not officially exist before grade 9 but in grade 8, students already
choose a specific study program that prepares them for a specific track (we confirmed this
by looking at common switching patterns). In practice, tracking thus occurs as from grade
8. Based on the study program, we can assign each student to a specific study program as
from grade 8.
We observe the administrative number of the school and the exact location of the campus
where the student is located. The administrative definition of a school does not always
overlap with the actual school as it is perceived by parents and children. Large schools often
44Note that the province of Brabant was split in three parts in 1995. We still use the historical province
of Brabant, which means we include the students of the Flemish province of Flemish Brabant, but also the
students in Brussels and Walloon Brabant who attend Flemish schools.
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have several administrative entities at the same address, while other schools use the same
administrative entity for schools in very different locations. We therefore use the address of
the campus where the student is located to create an identifier for each school. We assign
students to elite and non-elite schools based on the tracks that students actually choose at
these schools. We can compute travel distance to schools based on the exact location of the
school and the centroid of the statistical sector where the student lives.
We construct our outcome variables as follows. First, a student graduates from high
school if he or she obtains a degree within nine years of studying. Since all schools appear
in our dataset, we assume drop out from the data is drop out from the schooling system.
Second, a student graduates without study delay if he or she obtains the degree within six
years of studying. Finally, a student downgrades if he or she switches at least once to a lower
ranked track.
Appendix B: Sensitivity analysis
In this appendix, we assess how sensitive our results are to the chosen sample of students,
the composition of elite schools and the definition of obtaining a high school degree. The
different treatment effects of choosing an elite school on high school completion are shown
in Table B1. The first panel repeats the results from Table 5.
First, we restrict the sample to students for whom the exogeneity condition of the in-
strument is most likely to hold. Based on institutional grounds, we argue that distance is
an exogenous instrument for school choice in Flanders when controlling for neighborhood
characteristics. School choice is essentially free, and for most students several schools are
located within commuting distance. From our dataset, we have computed that for the me-
dian student, six schools are located within a 5 km distance. Therefore, it seems unlikely
that parents would base their location decision on a preference for certain schools. If our
instrument is not exogenous, we expect this violation of the exogeneity assumption to be
stronger in areas with fewer school alternatives, because parents may then decide to live
closer to their preferred school. We assess this issue and repeat the analysis on a subsample
of the data where we include only students who have at least four schooling options, located
within a 5 km radius. Sensitivity check A in Table B1 shows that the treatment effects de-
rived from the parametric model are almost identical to the treatment effects on the whole
sample. The ATT is statistically insignificant and the ATNT and ATE are significantly
positive. However, the ATT derived from the semi-parametric model is significantly positive
for this alternative sample.
In sensitivity check B, we restrict the sample to students living close to elite schools and
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Table B1: Sensitivity analysis obtaining a high school degree: average treatment effects
Semi-parametric approach Parametric approach
Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Main outcome: Obtaining a high school degree (N=111,571)
ATT 0.004 (0.019) -0.016 (0.008)
ATNT Not identifieda 0.051* (0.010)
ATE Not identifieda 0.033* (0.008)
Sensitivity A: Students with at least four schools within 5 km (N=76,580)
ATT 0.039* (0.019) -0.015 (0.011)
ATNT Not identifieda 0.047* (0.016)
ATE Not identifieda 0.029* (0.012)
Sensitivity B: Students with an elite school among the four closest schools (N=58,745)
ATT -0.028 (0.051) -0.029 (0.022)
ATNT Not identifieda 0.048 (0.037)
ATE Not identifieda 0.020 (0.024)
Sensitivity C: Students who choose the academic track (N=73,066)
ATT 0.026 (0.015) -0.008 (0.007)
ATNT Not identifieda 0.028* (0.007)
ATE Not identifieda 0.014* (0.005)
Sensitivity D: Students in schools that offer the academic track (N=97,297)
ATT 0.014 (0.019) -0.012 (0.007)
ATNT Not identifieda 0.046* (0.010)
ATE Not identifieda 0.028* (0.007)
Sensitivity E: Students still in school after three years of study delay omitted (N=111,275)
ATT -0.001 (0.018) -0.018* (0.008)
ATNT Not identifieda 0.049* (0.010)
ATE Not identifieda 0.031* (0.008)
Sensitivity F: Students still in school after three years of study delay classified as graduated (N=111,571)
ATT -0.002 (0.018) -0.018* (0.008)
ATNT Not identifieda 0.049* (0.011)
ATE Not identifieda 0.031* (0.008)
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector and computed with a
bootstrap procedure using 250 replications.
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
a Not identified due to insufficient common support.
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consider only students who have at least one elite school among the four closest schooling
options. If parents base their location decision on the availability of elite schools and move to
an area with an elite school, we would expect that the exogeneity condition of the instrument
is least likely to hold for students living in neighborhoods close to these schools. Similar to
our main specification, we obtain a statistically insignificant ATT in both approaches. The
ATE and ATNT derived from the parametric model are similar to the estimates from the
main specification, but less precisely estimated due to the smaller sample size.
In sensitivity check C, we restrict the sample to students starting the academic track
in the second grade of high school. This removes a large number of students, primarily in
the non-elite schools. Many of them are possibly not interested in staying in an elite school
if they would go there in the first year, as they are not willing to enroll in the academic
track. It could therefore generate more precise estimates by focusing on a more relevant
group of students. At the same time, it also removes some students who did want to enroll
in the academic track before they made their school choice but decided not to (or were
not permitted to). Note that we found that the elite school itself has a positive impact on
choosing the academic track for non-treated students and this improves their outcome. We
should therefore expect a less positive effect by removing these students as we are ignoring
part of the effect of an elite school. Indeed, the effects for the non-treated are smaller but
more precisely estimated in this restricted sample.
In sensitivity check D, we assess whether or not our results are robust to a different
composition of non-elite schools. There exist two different types of non-elite schools. The
first type are the general schools that offer programs in the academic track in combination
with technical, artistic or vocational programs. Most first year students (60.5%) enroll at this
type of schools. The second type of schools specialize in technical, artistic and/or vocational
programs and do not offer academic programs. These schools have a small share of first year
enrollment (12.8%). As students who start at a non-elite school without programs in the
academic track can differ from students who start at the first type of non-elite schools, we
repeat the analysis and include only students who started at an elite school and students
who started at a non-elite school that also offers the academic track. We obtain similar
results as in our main specification.
In the last two panels of Table B1, we assess whether or not our results are affected by
our assumptions on high school graduation. We observe students for a maximum of nine
years in high school: 0.3% of the students have not obtained a degree at the end of the
ninth year and are still enrolled in high school. As our main outcome variable is high school
completion, we considered these students as high school drop-outs in our previous analysis.
We assess whether or not our results are affected by this assumption and remove these
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students from the data in sensitivity check E. In sensitivity check F, we assume that these
students eventually obtain a high school degree and consider them as high school graduates.
The last two panels in Table B1 show that our results do not change when imposing other
assumptions on the study outcomes of these students.
Appendix C: Role of control variables
In this appendix, we assess how including neighborhood characteristics affects the treatment
effects of choosing an elite school on high school completion. Table C1 summarizes the
treatment effects based on the parametric model for several specifications with alternative
sets of control variables. When including only student characteristics we find an ATT of
-4.6 percentage points that is statistically significantly different from zero. The ATE and
ATNT are precisely estimated around 0. The effect of an elite school improves substantially
when we add a small set of dummy variables that capture the different location of students:
four categories of urbanization of the municipality and five dummy variables for provinces.
The ATT is now only -1.9 percentage points and the ATE and ATNT become statistically
significant, with positive treatment effects of 2.3 and 3.9 percentage points. Adding addi-
tional characteristics at the municipality level hardly affects the ATT and slightly increases
the ATE and ATNT. In the last specification (which is the one we use in the paper) we also
control for demographics at the statistical sector level which changes little to the results.
In Table C2 we show the impact of student characteristics on relative distance when
controlling for different sets of regional characteristics. The first specification shows that
individual characteristics explain only a small part of the variation (R²=0.006). Effect
sizes are relatively small too, but the large sample size does allow us to detect statistically
significant effects that can be informative to learn about a potential bias in the estimates
when we do not control for neighborhood characteristics. Importantly, we see that students
who repeated a grade before entering secondary education live 263 meters closer to an elite
school. This might seem like a small distance, but it is statistically significant. We interpret
this as an indication that students of lower ability live closer to elite schools. Since this
dummy variable is only a very rough proxy of ability, controlling for it is not sufficient to
obtain reliable estimates of treatment effects. After controlling for province and urbanization
fixed effects (FE), we explain much more of the variation (R²=0.142) and the effect of grade
repetition on the instrument reduces to a very small and statistically insignificant 10 meters.
This suggests that we are now better controlling for local differences in ability. Consistent
with this, we observe a strong improvement in the estimated effect of elite schools in Table
C1. Other controls for neighborhood characteristics help to further reduce the correlation
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between socioeconomic characteristics and the instrument, but this has much smaller effects
on the estimates of the treatment effects.
We conclude that Flanders is not sufficiently homogeneous to rely on distance as an
instrument for school choice without controlling for the broad differences between provinces
and levels of urbanization. Descriptive statistics show that proportionally more students of
lower ability are living in urban areas and that elite schools are more accessible for students
living in these areas. For example, 93% of the 75,595 students living in the most rural
municipalities graduate from high school while this is only 86% for the 15,808 students living
in the largest cities. 9% of students repeated a grade before entering secondary education in
the rural areas, while this is 19% in the largest cities. Meanwhile, the average difference in
distance to an elite school is only 835 meters for students living in the largest cities and 3013
meters for students living in the most rural municipalities. This is not surprising, as a larger
number of potential students in urban municipalities allows for more variety in school choice
and the possibility for schools to specialize in a track. It is therefore much easier to access
an elite school for students living in urban areas, explaining why 38% of them go to an elite
school. In rural municipalities this is only 24%. Without including controls for the different
types of municipalities, the estimator links lower performance in urban municipalities (which
are likely due to other factors than elite schools) with the easier access to elite schools, leading
to an underestimation of the treatment effects.
Table C1: The role of control variables: average treatment effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
ATT -0.046* (0.004) -0.019* (0.008) -0.015 (0.009) -0.016 (0.008)
ATNT 0.005 (0.014) 0.039* (0.010) 0.047* (0.010) 0.051* (0.011)
ATE -0.009 (0.011) 0.023* (0.008) 0.030* (0.008) 0.033* (0.009)
Student characteristics yes yes yes yes
Province and urbanization FE no yes yes yes
Neighborhood characteristics no no municipality municipality +
statistical sector
Note: Average treatment effects are calculated based on 111,571 students. Standard errors are
corrected for clustering within the statistical sector and computed by sampling 250 draws from
the estimated distribution. For each draw of the estimates we calculate the treatment effects by
simulating the error terms of the potential outcome framework (100 draws for each student).
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
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Table C2: The role of control variables: regression of relative distance on student character-
istics
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Mother no high school degreea -0.437* (0.047) -0.349* (0.041) -0.101* (0.038) -0.055 (0.033)
Mother high school degreea -0.370* (0.033) -0.224* (0.030) -0.055* (0.027) -0.023 (0.024)
No Dutch at home 0.803* (0.083) 0.158* (0.069) 0.092 (0.068) 0.040 (0.062)
Low income -0.135* (0.037) -0.124* (0.032) -0.062* (0.031) -0.046 (0.030)
Male -0.009 (0.021) -0.006 (0.019) -0.012 (0.019) -0.010 (0.019)
Repeated 0.263* (0.039) 0.010 (0.034) -0.028 (0.032) -0.025 (0.032)
Province and urbanization FE no yes yes yes
Neighborhood characteristics no no municipality municipality +
statistical sector
F-test individual characteristics 49.81 (p=0.000) 16.60 (p=0.000) 2.52 (p=0.0195) 1.28 (p=0.263)
R² 0.006 0.142 0.183 0.185
Observations 111,571 111,571 111,571 111,571
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector.
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
Appendix D: Additional tables and figures
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Table D1: Obtaining a high school degree: OLS and 2SLS
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Elite school 0.039* (0.002) 0.018* (0.002) -0.005 (0.010) -0.009 (0.010)
Mother no high schoola -0.086* (0.003) -0.091* (0.003)
Mother high schoola -0.032* (0.002) -0.036* (0.002)
No Dutch at home -0.046* (0.006) -0.044* (0.006)
Low income -0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002)
Male -0.048* (0.002) -0.048* (0.002)
Repeated -0.097* (0.004) -0.101* (0.004)
Constant 0.730* (0.028) 0.902* (0.027) 0.770* (0.030) 0.932* (0.029)
Neighborhood characteristics yes yes yes yes
Observations 111,571 111,571 111,571 111,571
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector. Neighborhood characteristics
include population density, median household income, the share of Belgians and average educational level at the
municipality and the statistical sector. All regressions additionally control for province fixed effects and indicators
for the level of urbanization of the municipality.
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
Figure D1: Weights for the calculation of the ATT
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Table D2: Obtaining a high school degree: estimation results semi-parametric approach
Selection equation Outcome equation
Index prop. score Baseline effect Difference if treated
Variables Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Relative distance 0.131* (0.004)
Mother no high schoola -0.659* (0.015) -0.087* (0.005) 0.026 (0.024)
Mother high schoola -0.406* (0.010) -0.030* (0.003) -0.008 (0.011)
No Dutch at home 0.251* (0.025) -0.025* (0.010) -0.075* (0.024)
Low income -0.119* (0.013) 0.006 (0.004) -0.030 (0.016)
Male -0.042* (0.010) -0.056* (0.003) 0.030* (0.008)
Repeated -0.496* (0.018) -0.100* (0.006) 0.050 (0.029)
Neighborhood characteristics yes yes yes
P-value no observable heterogeneity 0.000
P-value no unobservable heterogeneity 0.424
Observations 111,571
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector. The results are obtained
from a semi-parametric approach which follows the approach described in Section 4.3 of Cornelissen et
al. (2016) (pp. 55-56). The estimates of “Baseline effect” correspond to β0 in their equation (26), while
“Difference if treated” corresponds to β1-β0. The reported test statistic for observable heterogeneity
tests for joint significance of all elements in the vector β1-β0, while the test for unobservable heterogeneity
tests if MTEs differ with unobserved costs of treatment. We estimated the model in STATA with the user-
written command "mtefe" (Andresen, 2018).
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
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Table D3: Obtaining a high school degree: estimation results parametric approach
Selection equation Outcome equations
elite school elite school non-elite school
Variables Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Relative distance 0.131* (0.004)
Mother no high schoola -0.659* (0.015) -0.457* (0.051) -0.632* (0.021)
Mother high schoola -0.406* (0.010) -0.293* (0.035) -0.326* (0.018)
No Dutch at home 0.253* (0.025) -0.290* (0.048) -0.131* (0.029)
Low income -0.118* (0.013) -0.064 (0.035) -0.004 (0.016)
Male -0.042* (0.010) -0.413* (0.027) -0.343* (0.013)
Repeated -0.496* (0.018) -0.458* (0.051) -0.473* (0.018)
Constant 2.388* (0.261) 1.831* (0.417) 1.844* (0.222)
Neighborhood characteristics yes yes yes
ρ1 -0.185* (0.070)
ρ0 0.193* (0.058)
Log likelihood -82068
Observations 111,571
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector. The results are obtained
from a parametric model where we assume that the error terms are jointly normally distributed. We
estimated the model in STATA with the user-written command "switch probit" (Lokshin and Sajaia,
2011).
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
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Table D4: Graduating without study delay: average treatment effects
Semi-parametric approach Parametric approach
Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
ATT 0.016 (0.030) -0.010 (0.018)
ATNT Not identifieda 0.112* (0.020)
ATE Not identifieda 0.080* (0.016)
Note: Average treatment effects are calculated based on 111,571 students. Standard
errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector and computed with a
bootstrap procedure using 250 replications. Average outcome in sample: 0.775 (Elite),
0.700 (non-elite).
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
a Not identified due to insufficient common support.
Figure D2: Graduating without study delay: MTE
Note: MTEs are calculated based on 111,571 students using a local
polynomial regression of degree 2 with an Epanechnikov kernel.
Standard errors are computed with a bootstrap procedure (250
replications) and clustered within the statistical sector. P-value
no observable heterogeneity (0.000), p-value no unobservable
heterogeneity (0.882).
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Table D5: Graduating without study delay: estimation results semi-parametric approach
Selection equation Outcome equation
Index prop. score Baseline effect Difference if treated
Variables Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Relative distance 0.131* (0.004)
Mother no high schoola -0.659* (0.015) -0.162* (0.007) -0.004 (0.035)
Mother high schoola -0.406* (0.010) -0.082* (0.006) -0.040 (0.021)
No Dutch at home 0.251* (0.025) -0.093* (0.013) -0.011 (0.034)
Low income -0.119* (0.013) -0.009 (0.006) -0.055* (0.021)
Male -0.042* (0.010) -0.149* (0.004) 0.162 (0.013)
Repeated -0.496* (0.018) -0.042* (0.007) -0.035 (0.035)
Neighborhood characteristics yes yes yes
P-value no observable heterogeneity 0.000
P-value no unobservable heterogeneity 0.882
Observations 111,571
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector. The results are obtained
from a semi-parametric approach which follows the approach described in Section 4.3 of Cornelissen et
al. (2016) (pp. 55-56). The estimates of “Baseline effect” correspond to β0 in their equation (26), while
“Difference if treated” corresponds to β1-β0. The reported test statistic for observable heterogeneity
tests for joint significance of all elements in the vector β1-β0, while the test for unobservable heterogeneity
tests if MTEs differ with unobserved costs of treatment. We estimated the model in STATA with the user-
written command "mtefe" (Andresen, 2018).
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
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Table D6: Graduating without study delay: estimation results parametric approach
Selection equation Outcome equations
elite school elite school non-elite school
Variables Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Relative distance 0.131* (0.004)
Mother no high schoola -0.659* (0.015) -0.512* (0.037) -0.539* (0.159)
Mother high schoola -0.405* (0.011) -0.318* (0.024) -0.318* (0.013)
No Dutch at home 0.251* (0.025) -0.307* (0.039) -0.227* (0.025)
Low income -0.118* (0.013) -0.122* (0.025) -0.054* (0.012)
Male -0.042* (0.010) -0.501* (0.018) -0.454* (0.010)
Repeated -0.496* (0.018) -0.212* (0.040) -0.146* (0.016)
Constant 2.384* (0.261) 0.894* (0.287) 0.788* (0.175)
Neighborhood characteristics yes yes yes
ρ1 -0.172* (0.047)
ρ0 0.137* (0.037)
Log likelihood -114367
Observations 111,571
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector. The results are obtained
from a parametric model where we assume that the error terms are jointly normally distributed. We
estimated the model in STATA with the user-written command "switch probit" (Lokshin and Sajaia,
2011).
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
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Table D7: Extended model: estimation results selection equations
Selection equation Selection equation
elite school academic track
after non-elite after elite
Variables Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Relative distance elite school 0.206* (0.006)
Relative distance academic track -0.103* (0.014) 0.032* (0.011) -0.015 (0.016)
Mother no high schoola -0.931* (0.021) -1.268* (0.042) -0.889* (0.085)
Mother high schoola -0.573* (0.015) -0.879* (0.030) -0.524* (0.054)
No Dutch at home 0.356* (0.036) 0.559* (0.039) -0.012 (0.059)
Low income -0.164* (0.018) -0.135* (0.016) -0.163* (0.037)
Male -0.063* (0.014) -0.309* (0.014) -0.220* (0.027)
Repeated -0.693* (0.025) -1.192* (0.041) -0.839* (0.071)
Factor loading 1 (.) 0.870* (0.058) 0.251 (0.156)
Neighborhood characteristics yes yes yes
Log likelihood -137321
Observations 111,571
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector. The results are
obtained from a factor model. We estimated the model with the STATA command “gsem”. Effects
of neighborhood characteristics on track constrained to be the same, regardless of elite
school choice.
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
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Table D8: Extended model: estimation results outcome equations
Outcome equations
Academic track Other track
elite school non-elite school elite school non-elite school
Variables Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Relative distance elite school
Relative distance academic track
Mother no high schoola -0.379* (0.052) -0.537* (0.054) -0.224 (0.119) -0.558* (0.071)
Mother high schoola -0.254* (0.035) -0.302* (0.039) -0.143 (0.097) -0.244* (0.052)
No Dutch at home -0.367* (0.056) -0.181* (0.046) -0.097 (0.119) -0.138* (0.043)
Low income -0.071 (0.040) -0.086* (0.027) 0.077 (0.082) 0.050* (0.021)
Male -0.412* (0.030) -0.438* (0.024) -0.392* (0.073) -0.269* (0.023)
Repeated -0.394* (0.055) -0.497* (0.055) -0.207* (0.100) -0.395* (0.053)
Factor loading -0.247* (0.116) 0.147 (0.087) -0.448* (0.150) 0.186 (0.129)
Neighborhood characteristics yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood -137321
Observations 111,571
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector. The results are obtained from a
factor model. We estimate the model with the STATA command “gsem”. Effects of neighborhood characteristics
on outcome constrained to be the same for each track choice but allowed to differ by school choice.
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
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Table D9: Extended model using track in grade 9: average treatment effects
Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Treatment Elite school Academic track Elite school
Outcome High school degree High school degree Academic track
ATT -0.010 (0.008) 0.072* (0.009) 0.070* (0.011)
ATNT 0.048* (0.010) 0.069* (0.010) 0.175* (0.030)
ATE 0.032* (0.008) 0.072* (0.008) 0.147* (0.024)
Note: Average treatment effects are calculated based on 111,571 students. Standard errors are
corrected for clustering within the statistical sector and computed by sampling 250 draws from
the estimated distribution. For each draw of the estimates we calculate the treatment effects by
simulating the error terms of the potential outcome framework (100 draws for each student).
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
Table D10: Extended model using track in grade 9: average treatment effects conditional
upon track choice
No restrictions Only academic track No academic track
Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
ATT -0.010 (0.008) -0.003 (0.006) -0.072* (0.023)
ATNT 0.048* (0.010) 0.037* (0.012) 0.027 (0.015)
ATE 0.032* (0.008) 0.026* (0.009) 0.000 (0.013)
Note: Average treatment effects are calculated based on 111,571 students. Standard errors are
corrected for clustering within the statistical sector and computed by sampling 250 draws from
the estimated distribution. For each draw of the estimates we calculate the treatment effects by
simulating the error terms of the potential outcome framework (100 draws for each student).
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
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Table D11: Downgrading: estimation results semi-parametric approach
Selection equation Outcome equation
Index prop. score Baseline effect Difference if treated
Variables Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Relative distance 0.131* (0.004)
Mother no high schoola -0.659* (0.015) 0.128* (0.008) 0.126* (0.036)
Mother high schoola -0.406* (0.010) 0.100* (0.007) 0.049* (0.023)
No Dutch at home 0.251* (0.025) -0.013 (0.013) 0.001 (0.034)
Low income -0.119* (0.013) 0.014* (0.006) 0.040 (0.023)
Male -0.042* (0.010) 0.024* (0.005) 0.099* (0.014)
Repeated -0.496* (0.018) 0.023* (0.008) 0.240* (0.039)
Neighborhood characteristics yes yes yes
P-value no observable heterogeneity 0.000
P-value no unobservable heterogeneity 0.913
Observations 111,571
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector. The results are obtained
from a semi-parametric approach which follows the approach described in Section 4.3 of Cornelissen et
al. (2016) (pp. 55-56). The estimates of “Baseline effect” correspond to β0 in their equation (26), while
“Difference if treated” corresponds to β1-β0. The reported test statistic for observable heterogeneity
tests for joint significance of all elements in the vector β1-β0, while the test for unobservable heterogeneity
tests if MTEs differ with unobserved costs of treatment. We estimated the model in STATA with the user-
written command "mtefe" (Andresen, 2018).
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
53
Figure D3: Downgrading: MTE
Note: MTEs are calculated based on 111,571 students using a local
polynomial regression of degree 2 with an Epanechnikov kernel.
Standard errors are computed with a bootstrap procedure (250
replications) and clustered within the statistical sector. P-value
no observable heterogeneity (0.000), p-value no unobservable
heterogeneity (0.913).
54
Table D12: Downgrading: parametric approach
Selection equation Outcome equations
elite school elite school non-elite school
Variables Coef. St. error Coef. St. error Coef. St. error
Relative distance 0.131* (0.004)
Mother no high schoola -0.659* (0.015) 0.628* (0.033) 0.378* (0.016)
Mother high schoola -0.406* (0.010) 0.468* (0.021) 0.291* (0.013)
No Dutch at home 0.251* (0.025) -0.143* (0.040) 0.007 (0.023)
Low income -0.119* (0.013) 0.107* (0.023) 0.046* (0.012)
Male -0.043* (0.010) 0.296* (0.016) 0.101* (0.009)
Repeated -0.497* (0.018) 0.467* (0.036) 0.106* (0.015)
Constant 2.394* (0.261) -1.744* (0.275) -0.735* (0.159)
Neighborhood characteristics yes yes yes
ρ1 -0.006 (0.040)
ρ0 0.123* (0.034)
Log likelihood -121935
Observations 111,571
Note: Standard errors are corrected for clustering within the statistical sector. The results are obtained
from a parametric model where we assume that the error terms are jointly normally distributed. We
estimated the model in STATA with the user-written command "switch probit" (Lokshin and Sajaia,
2011).
* Statistical significance at 5% level.
a Base category = mother has a degree in higher education.
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